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TORT LAW-RECKLESS MISCONDUCT IN SPORTS-The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has allowed a professional
athlete to recover for an injury caused during a game by the reckless
misconduct of an opponent in violation of game rules and customs.
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
On September 16, 1973, the Denver Broncos and the Cincinnati Bengals were engaged in a professional football game in Denver, Colorado.
During the game, a Bronco intercepted a pass intended for Charles
"Booby" Clark, a Bengal fullback. After the interception, Dale
Hackbart, a Bronco, unsuccessfully attempted to block Clark by throwing his body in front of Clark. Clark, acting out of anger and frustration, approached Hackbart from behind and struck him on the back of
the head with a forearm. 1 Clark's conduct violated a National Football
League rule which specifically prohibits players from striking an opponent's head or neck with a hand, forearm, or elbow.2 Because the
referees had not witnessed the act, they did not call a penalty. A
physical examination revealed that Hackbart had sustained a serious
neck fracture.'
Hackbart initiated a suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado to recover damages from Clark and Clark's employer, the Cincinnati Bengals.' The plaintiff claimed reckless misconduct or, alternatively, negligence. 5 The district court held that it would
be inappropriate to apply traditional tort concepts to a case involving
injuries sustained during a professional football game.' Furthermore,
the court held that tort recovery based upon negligence or reckless
misconduct was precluded by the doctrine of assumption of risk.'
1. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.), cerL denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979).
2. Id. at 521. The official league sanction for a violation of the rule is a 15 yard
penalty and disqualification from the game. R. TREAT, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOTBALL
681 (13th ed. 1975).
3. 601 F.2d at 519.
4. Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977).
5. Id. at 355.
6. Id. at 358. The district court determined that the violent character of football
precluded a standard of reasonableness from being applied to game conduct. Id. at 356.
The court stated that it was not competent to determine the standard governing professional football. Additionally, the court expressed concern about the impact judicial intervention would have on the game, concluding that any such intervention must come
from the legislature, not the judiciary. Id. at 358.
7. Id. at 356. The doctrine of assumption of risk has been surrounded by much controversy and confusion. Assumption of risk is a voluntary consent by the plaintiff, either

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 19:191

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed8
the district court's decision and rejected the notion that tortious conduct which occurs during a professional football game should be removed from the restraints of law.' In an opinion written by Judge
Doyle, the court examined the jurisdiction of the district court,10 the
appropriate theory of recovery, and the possible defenses."
The court concluded that the evidence at trial did not support the
district court's assumption that even though Clark's conduct normally
would result in the imposition of civil or criminal sanctions it should be
excepted because it occurred during a football game." The court also
stated that certain tortious conduct could not be ignored simply
because it occurred during a game which was violent or difficult to ad3
minister.1
In allowing the recklessness action, the court determined that intentional injury is prohibited by the written rules" and customs of professional football." Declaring that the rules and customs of the game
establish reasonable boundaries designed to prevent a participant from
intentionally inflicting serious injury on another participant, the court
concluded that reason has not been abandoned and that the victim of
an unlawful blow is not limited to retaliation as his sole remedy.'6 No
principles of law exist which permit a court to rule out tort recovery
because a game is rough or difficult to administer. 7
express or implied, to accept the dangers of a known and appreciated risk. It acts to
relieve the defendant of any duty to exercise care, thereby precluding recovery if an injury results from negligence or reckless misconduct. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 68 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] for a general discussion of
the doctrine of assumption of risk. If injury results from an intentional tort, the appropriate analysis centers around the doctrine of consent. Consent is a willingness to
allow an act to occur, thereby negating any wrongful element of the defendant's act and
precluding recovery. See id- § 18. See generally James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy
Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
8. 601 F.2d at 527.
9. Id. at 520.
10. Id. at 521-24. The court addressed as a jurisdictional question what the district
court had analyzed as a question of the existence of a cause of action for injuries sustained in professional football. 435 F. Supp. at 357-58.
11. 601 F.2d at 520.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, art. 1,
item 1(c) (1973) provides: "All players are prohibited from striking on the head, face or
neck with the heel, back or side of the hand, wrist, forearm, elbow or clasped hands." 601
F.2d at 521.
15. 601 F.2d at 521. Testimony by other professional football players supported the
proposition that Clark's conduct was not accepted by the customs of the game. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 520.
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The court stated that where jurisdiction properly lies in a federal
district court, that court has a duty to take jurisdiction of a case
presented to it for resolution. 8 Noting that although there are situations in which a district court can deny jurisdiction,'9 Judge Doyle concluded that the case at bar did not conform to any of those exceptions"
and likewise found no applicable restrictions to the jurisdiction in Colorado law.2 The court concluded that it is the duty of the judiciary to
protect individual rights under the law, and that the trial court did not
have the discretion to deny Hackbart jurisdiction simply because the
injury occurred during a professional football game.'
The court next addressed which theory of recovery should be applied to Hackbart's action." The court distinguished recklessness from
the intentional torts of assault and battery. Recklessness involves a
18. Id. at 522. There are two bases for federal jurisdiction: Federal questions and
diversity of citizenship. Federal question jurisdiction exists when the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) (1976). Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction exists when a controversy is between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). As the court in Hackbart noted, in a
diversity of citizenship case the federal district court sits as a state trial court and it must
apply the laws of the forum state. 601 F.2d at 522. Accordingly, the Hackbart court determined that, absent state policy or law, a federal district court cannot outlaw certain activities on an independent basis. Id. at 523.
19. The political question and abstention doctrines are two examples of such limitations. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
The political question doctrine holds that certain matters which are political in nature are
better resolved by political entities than by judicial review. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962). The abstention doctrine holds that when a constitutional issue rests on an
unsettled interpretation of state law, a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction
in favor of resolution of the matter in state court. See Railroad Comm'r v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
20. 601 F.2d at 522.
21. Id. at 523-24. The court relied upon COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 6, and the protection
against harm that it provides for individual rights, and the liberal construction given
COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 9, cl. 1, in conferring unlimited jurisdiction on district courts. See
Cruz v. Morley, 77 Colo. 25, 234 P. 178 (1924).
22. 601 F.2d at 520.
23. Although the plaintiff claimed negligence at the district court level, on appeal the
plaintiff did not rely upon a negligence theory because of his recognition that the essence
of negligence, subjecting another to an unreasonable risk of harm, is inherent in the game
of football. Brief for Appellant at 9-11.
24. Assault and battery is the appropriate theory of recovery for intentional acts. To
be liable for a civil battery, the defendant must do some positive act which is intended to
cause, and does cause, a harmful or offensive contact with another person. If the defendant, acting with the same intent present in a battery, places another in imminent apprehension of a harmful contact, he is liable for assault. Therefore, to establish liability
for assault and battery, the plaintiff must prove the elements of both an assault and a battery. See PROSSER, supra note 7, §§ 9-10. See, e.g., Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412,
128 N.E.2d 363 (1955) (defendant held liable for assault and battery for intentional misconduct during a basketball game).
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choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the danger it
presents, or under circumstances which a reasonable man would know
to be dangerous. It requires a risk substantially greater in magnitude
than is necessary for negligence." Assault and battery involves an intent to do an act and an intent to do a particular harm, while recklessness requires an intent to do a particular act but without an intent to
cause a particular harm." The court determined that because the facts
of the case fit perfectly into the recklessness framework it was the appropriate theory of recovery."
Finally, the court addressed the admissibility of certain films as
evidence. Films of other professional football games which depicted
acts of violence were deemed to be irrelevant and inadmissible because
the game of football was not on trial.' Films showing Hackbart violating the rules of the game were also held to be irrelevant unless he was
shown to have been the aggressor in the incident at issue.'
Concluding that Hackbart was entitled to an assessment of his
rights and whether they had been violated, the court reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of the
evidence."
The Hackbart decision is the most recent judicial pronouncement of
the tort liability" of professional athletes for misconduct occurring in
professional sporting events and continues a trend toward expanding
the liability of athletes for game misconduct.2 Previously courts had
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §.500, Comment g (1965).
26. 601 F.2d at 524.
27. Id. at 525. Having decided that the proper theory of recovery was recklessness,
the court concluded that the appropriate statute of limitations for recklessness was the
six-year period provided in COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973), rather than the one-year
period for assault and battery under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 (1973). Thus, Hackbart,
who failed to initiate his suit within a year of his injury, could maintain his action under
the six-year statute of limitations. 601 F.2d at 525.
28. 601 F.2d at 526.
29. Id. If Hackbart was the aggressor, the films may have been relevant to prove his
character. However, a determination that Hackbart was the aggressor had not been made
in the lower court.
30. Id. at 526-27.
31. The development of the criminal liability of a participant for sports injuries has
also been slow. However, Canadian courts recently have addressed the problem of
violence in sports at a criminal level. See Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R.3d 164 (Ont. Prov.
1970); Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. 1970). Both cases involved an altercation between players engaged in a professional hockey game in 1969. Canadian officials
brought charges against both players for criminal assault against the other. However, the
defendants were acquitted. See Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75
MICH. L. REV. 148 (1976); Comment, Violence in ProfessionalSports, 1975 Wis. L. REV.
771, for an analysis of the criminal responsibility of an athlete.
32. Most of the tort litigation has been based upon misconduct in amateur athletics.
See, e.g., Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955) (liability based on
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been reluctant to become involved in this area because of a fear of
disrupting the development of sports and encouraging an unmanageable volume of litigation.'
The doctrine of assumption of risk has presented the greatest
obstacle to tort recovery for injuries sustained during sports participation.m Generally, a participant assumes all the ordinary and inherent
risks attendant to a sport. ' An assumed risk precludes the existence
of a duty and thereby relieves the defendant of any legal wrong for his
conduct.3 6 Courts have developed exceptions to the defense of assumption of risk when the participant's injuries result from unexpected occurrences such as unsportsmanlike conduct 7 or risks not inherent to
the sport.38
Jurisdictions that have restricted or abolished the doctrine of
assumption of risk have focused on the duty owed by one participant
to another.' The courts have used varying standards to define a participant's duty. In Nabozny v. Barnhill," an Illinois appellate court
assault and battery for injuries sustained during an amateur basketball game); McGee v.
Board of Educ., 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1962) (suit alleging negligence
for injuries incurred at a high school baseball practice); Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist.,
72 Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d 936 (1967) (recovery for negligence resulting in injuries during a
high school wrestling match).
33. See, e.g., Gaspard v. Grain Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 131 So. 2d 831 (La. Ct. App.
1961).
34. Where the injury results from intentional conduct, consent rather than assumption of risk, is the chief obstacle. See note 7 supra.
35. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929);
Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 233 Or. 1, 376 P.2d 406 (1962). In Murphy the plaintiff was denied recovery for injuries sustained from an amusement park
ride. The court held that where the dangers of a sport are obvious and necessary the participant assumes the risk of such dangers. Similarly, in Vendrell recovery was denied for
injuries sustained from ordinary tackling in a football game. Such contact was held to be
an assumed risk and, therefore, not actionable. See also Arnold v. Schmeiser, 34 A.D.2d
568, 309 N.Y.S.2d 699 (App. Div. 1970) (child playing game assumed the obvious and
necessary risks of the game); Jenks v. McGranaghan, 32 A.D.2d 989, 299 N.Y.S.2d 228
(App. Div. 1969) (golfers assume the risk of injury inherent in golf).
36. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 68.
37. See Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976). In Bourque the
court stated that although the plaintiff assumed the ordinary risks involved in a softball
game, he did not assume the risk of reckless or unsportsmanlike conduct. Id. at 42. See
also Jolley v. Chicago Thoroughbred Enterprises, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (injuries sustained because of the bad faith actions of fellow jockeys were not assumed

risks).
38. See Oberheim v. Pennsylvania Sports and Enterprises, Inc., 358 Pa. 62, 55 A.2d
766 (1947). In Oberheim the court held that a skater did not assume the risk of injury
from dangerous conditions which were not ordinary or foreseeable effects of skating, and,
therefore, not inherent risks of the sport. Id. at 68, 55 A.2d at 769.
39. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 I1. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975); Bourque v.
Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
40. 31 IlM.App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975).
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stated that a participant has a duty to refrain from conduct proscribed
by safety rules as opposed to conduct contrary to game rules. 1 Reasoning that a person violating a safety rule exhibits a reckless disregard
for the safety of other participants, the Nabonzy court held that failure
to refrain from such conduct gives rise to a cause of action for the injured player."2 A Louisiana appellate court, in Bourque v. Duplechin,3
held that players have a duty to play a game in ordinary fashion
without unsportsmanlike conduct." The duty analysis employed by
these courts narrows the scope of inherent risks of a game to those
risks not created by breach of duty."5 Because assumption of risk is applied to inherent risks, the duty analysis approach has begun to limit
its application.'
The Hackbart court did not expressly rely on an assumption of risk
or duty analysis. Although the district court had held that Hackbart
had assumed the risk of injury from Clark's conduct, 7 the court of appeals did not address this issue. 8 Rather than discussing assumption of
risk, the Hackbart court engaged in a detailed discussion of the
jurisdictional question. 9 Because the court did not set out a clear conceptual framework for its decision, the implications of the opinion for
future litigation in the area are uncertain. Nevertheless, because the
court did determine that the rules and customs of the game are an appropriate standard to be used in determining whether liability should
be imposed for an athletic injury,' the practical effect of the court's
decision is to limit the assumption of risk defense to injuries resulting
from conduct which conforms to the rules and customs of the sport. In
essence, this establishes a participant's duty to refrain from conduct
outside the reasonable boundaries established by the sport's rules and
customs.
In relying upon the rules and customs of the game as a measure of
41. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261. Sports are built upon a comprehensive set of rules.
Safety rules are designed to protect participants from injury. Game rules are promulgated to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d
at 260.
42. Id. at 215, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
43. 331 So. 2d 40 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
44. Id. at 42.
45. See id.
46. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975); Bourque v.
Duplechin, 331 So. 2d at 42.
47. 435 F. Supp. at 356.
48. 601 F.2d at 520. The court of appeals did discuss the applicability of a contributory fault defense to the action; however, the court did not decide the issue because
the trial court did not consider it. Id.
49. Id. at 521-24.
50. Id. at 521.

1980

Recent Decisions

liability, the Hackbart court did not distinguish between game rules
and safety rules. Because Clark's conduct violated a safety rule,
however, the court's decision may be interpreted as imposing liability
only upon players who violate safety rules. Because game rules are instituted to achieve a more organized and controlled game, game rule
violations would seem to be an ordinary and inherent risk to which all
participants consent. In contrast, safety rules are specifically designed
to protect participants from harm. Certainly a participant does not consent to a violation of safety rules."
The Hackbart court decided that reckless misconduct was the appropriate theory of recovery under the facts of the case. In prior cases,
negligence52 and assault and battery-3 had been the theories of recovery relied upon. While dicta in prior decisions indicated that
reckless misconduct could be actionable,' Hackbart recognized such a
cause of action.
A negligence claim places a burden on the plaintiff to show that the
defendant exposed him to an unreasonable risk of harm.55 Because exposure to an unreasonable risk of harm is inherent in the violent
nature of football, negligence is not an appropriate standard. 8 The
plaintiffs burden in a negligence action is too light. On the other hand,
an intentional tort theory requires the plaintiff to overcome the difficult burden of proving both an intent to act and an intent to harm.57
Recklessness represents a middle ground between negligence and
assault and battery." Unlike a plaintiff complaining of assault and bat51. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, Comment b (1965) provides a workable solution for determining the extent of a participant's consent to game conduct. Comment b to § 50 states:
Taking part in a game. Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit
to such bodily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or
usages. Participating in such a game does not manifest consent to contacts which
are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules or usages are designed
to protect the participants and not merely to secure the better playing of the game
as a test of skill. This is true although the player knows that those with or against
whom he is playing are habitual violators of such rules.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, Comment b (1965).
52. See, e.g., Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. No. 103, 72 Wash. 2d 939, 435 P.2d
936 (1967); McGee v. Board of Educ., 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1962).
53. See, e.g., Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955).
54. See Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d at 42; Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Inl. App. 3d at
214, 334 N.E.2d at 261.
55. See PROSSER, supra note 7, § 31. Recognizing this, the plaintiff in Hackbart did
not rely on a negligence theory on appeal.
56. 601 F.2d at 520. See also Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 233
Or. 1, 15, 376 P.2d 406, 412-13 (1962).
57. See note 33 supra.
58. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
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tery, the plaintiff in a recklessness action does not have the burden of
proving that the defendant intended the resulting harm.59 However, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving more than negligence: he must show
that the defendant consciously chose to commit an unreasonable act with
disregard for the great risk it presented." Thus, a recklessness theory
affords a better balance between protection from harm and the desire to
avoid meddling with sports.
The result in Hackbart should be applauded as another step toward
recognition of a duty of care owed by athletes to competitors, and the
limitation of assumption of risk and consent as general defenses to actions in this area. By acknowledging that the rules and customs of football set the reasonable boundaries for a participant's conduct, the
Hackbart court has also established what conduct is unreasonable. Consequently, the limits of a participant's duty have been outlined.
Hackbart has pointed to recklessness as the appropriate theory for
recovery rather than the broader theory of negligence or the more
restrictive theory of assault and battery. This will present an injured
participant with a more realistic opportunity to recover for injuries
sustained during a game, while at the same time, it will not unduly
burden the continuation of the sport.
Because tort law condemns unreasonably dangerous activity off the
playing field, it is inconsistent to give someone license to completely
disregard the safety of another merely because the two are involved in
a sporting event. Condoning a system where, in the name of athletic
competition, a person is permitted to recklessly inflict an injury on
another is contrary to one of the goals of tort law, compensation of the
injured party. The Hackbart decision is a judicial recognition of the notion that legal duties accompany a player into a game.
David S. Horvitz

59. See RESTATEMENT
60. Id. Comment g.

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 500, Comment f (1965).

